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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : Case No. 860273-CA 
v. : 
JOSEPH GREG TRUJILLO, : Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Joseph Greg Trujillo, was charged with 
Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by a Restricted Person, a third-
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503 (1978) . 
Defendant was convicted of Possession of a Dangerous 
Weapon by a Restricted Person in a non-jury trial held April 16, 
1986, in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup, presiding. 
Judge Rigtrup sentenced defendant on April 16, 1986 to not more 
than five yars in the Utah State Prison. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
As Officer Michael Beesley patrolled downtown Salt Lake 
City in the early morning hours of February 28, 1986, he noticed 
defendant and two other men walking between 300 and 400 South 
State Street (R. 33-34). It was 3:30 a.m. and the men were 
walking slowly, stopping occasionally to peer into windows (R. 
34, 47). Defendant carried a nylon knapsack at his side but when 
he looked over and saw Officer Beesley watching him, he moved the 
knapsack in front of his body, concealing it from view (R. 36-
37). 
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Officer Beesley pulled over and got out of his patrol 
car (R. 37). As he did so, he watched defendant walk over to a 
garbage container and place the knapsack on the ground next to 
the container as if to "stash11 it (R. 37-38). The men seemed 
nervous and became increasingly so as the officer approached (R. 
38, 51-52). Officer Beesley asked them what they were doing and 
asked for identification (R. 38-39, 54). Only one of the men 
produced identification and Beesley took down their names in his 
notebook (R. 54). 
Defendant did all of the talking for the group and 
stated that they were on their way to his cousin's house (R. 39, 
54, 55). Their attitude appeared evasive and they looked nervous 
to Beesley (R. 55). In Beesley's experience, people were not 
usually this nervous when approached by a police officer but were 
usually cooperative (R. 55). Beesley had been patrolling the 
downtown area for a couple of years and knew it to be a high 
crime area witn numerous recent reports of vehicle break-ins(R. 
35, 44) . 
When a back-up officer arrived, Beesley decided to 
frisk the men for weapons (R. 39-40, 113-115). Since the men 
were so nervous, he thought they might use a weapon on him if 
they had any (R. 40). Beesley told defendant to put his hands on 
the car and spread his legs; but after he did so, defendant 
pulled his hands back and reached for his coat (R. 115). Each 
officer grabbed a hand (R. 115). 
As he frisked defendant, outside his clothing, Beesley 
felt a bulge in the upper chest area (R. 40-41). It felt like a 
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Knife and defendant volunteered that it was a knife (R. 41). 
Beesley handcuffed defendant and reached inside his coat to 
retreive an 8 to 10 inch knife from a sheath strapped to 
defendant's chest (R 41-43). Beesley arrested defendant, who was 
a convicted felon, for carrying a concealed weapon (R. 43, 73). 
Defendant moved to suppress the knife based upon 
alleged violations of Art. I § 14 of the Utah Constitution and 
the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution (R. 14). 
Judge Rigtrup denied the motion and found defendant guilty of 
possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person (R. 17). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Based upon the facts known to him at the time, the 
officer was justified in detaining and frisking defendant for 
weapons. The officer's initial approach was not a "stop" but was 
an encounter that is allowable between police officers and 
individuals without any basis whatsoever to believe the 
individuals are involved in criminal activity. Once the officer 
had approached defendant and his companions and amassed enough 
information to create a reasonable suspicion that defendant was 
armed, the officer was acting within fourth amendment bounds in 
frisking defendant for weapons. 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT WAS NOT UNLAWFULLY DETAINED OR 
FRISKED IN VIOLATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT. 
Defendant moved to suppress the knife found on his 
person claiming that he was unlawfully stopped and detained in 
violation of Art. I $ 14 of the Utah Constitution and the Fourth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution (R. 14). On appeal, 
-3-
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defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion 
to dismiss because his fourth amendment rights were violated. 
Because defendant does not claim or analyze any Art. I S 14 
violation on appeal, the State's response is also limited to 
fourth amendment concerns. 
First, it must be recognized that not every encounter 
between a police officer and a citizen is a seizure. Police 
officers are free to approach individuals "at anytime and pose 
questions so long as the citizen is not detained against his will 
. . . " United States v. Merritt, 736 F.2d 223, 230 (5th Cir. 
1984); see also Florida v. Rover, 460 U.S. 491, 498-499 (1983). 
An officer who is rightfully in a public place and who poses 
questions to an individual has not engaged in a seizure, 
detention or investigatory stop. State v. Christensen, 676 P.2d 
408 (Utah 984). A mere request for identification is not likely 
to result in a seizure of the person, Immigration & Naturaliza-
tion Service v. Delqado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984); because the 
individual normally need not answer and may simply leave, State 
v. Belanger, 677 P.2d 781 (Wash. App. 1984). Such an encounter, 
however, matures into a seizure only when "in view of all the 
circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would 
have believed that he was not free to leave." United States v. 
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980). 
In this case, defendant apparently assumes that he was 
•seized" from the moment Officer Beesley exited his patrol car 
because he fails to enumerate as factors contributing to 
reasonable suspicion any of the facts discovered by the officer 
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after this point in time and prior to the pat-down of defendant. 
See Appelalnt's Brief at 6. Nevertheless, it is clear that 
Officer Beesley did not seize defendant by walking up to him and 
asking him and his companions what they were doing and requesting 
identification. Merritt, 736 F.2d at 230; Delgado, 466 U.S. at 
210. See also Belanger, 677 P.2d at 781 (appearance of two men 
in high crime area at 6:15 a.m. Sunday gave officer limited duty 
and authority to approach and inquire about suspicious 
circumstances); G.R. v. State, 638 P.2d 191 (Alaska App. 1981) 
(approach of three men standing by parked car on deserted road at 
1:30 a.m. and questioning on nervous behavior without show of 
authority not a "stop"). On the other hand, defendant was 
clearly detained at the time he was frisked for weapons. At this 
point, the encounter escalated to a detention because no 
reasonable person would think he was free to leave rather than 
submit to the pat-down. The only remaining question is whether 
the pat-down of defendant was based on a reasonable suspicion 
that defendant was armed. Terrv v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); 
State v. Rovbal, 716 P.2d 291 (Utah 1986); Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-
16 (1978). 
By the time Officer Beesley patted-down defendant's 
clothing, he was armed with the following information: 
1. Defendant and two companions were walking slowly 
down State Street between 300 and 400 South, stopping to gaze 
into windows at 3:30 a.m. on February 28, 1986 (R. 34). 
2. Numerous car prowls had been recently reported in 
this area and investigated by himself and other officers (R. 35, 
44, 51-52). 
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3. When defendant noticed the officer watching from 
the patrol car after he looked at the officer, he moved a nylon 
knapsack he held from a position at his side to a position in 
front of his body where it was concealed from the officer1s view 
(R. 36, 48-49). 
4. When the officer got out of his patrol car, 
defendant walked over a few feet from where he and his companions 
stood and put the knapsack down beside a garbage can and walked 
away (R. 37-38). 
5. The group appeared nervous (R. 38, 55). 
6. When the officer asked what they were doing, they 
seemed evasive, with defendant finally offering that they were 
going to his cousinfs house (R. 38-39, 54). 
7. Only one of the three had any identification. 
8. In Officer Beesley's experience, people are not 
usually nervous when approached by a police officer but are 
cooperative (R. 55). 
While defendant goes to great lengths to treat these 
factors individually and to discount each factor's value, the law 
requires this Court to consider defendant's claim of 
unconstitutionality in light of all the facts, with no one factor 
determinative of the outcome, United States v. Trullo, 809 F.2d 
108, 111 (1st Cir. 1987); State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 659 
(Utah 1985); State v. Houser, 669 P.2d 437, 439 (Utah 1983). In 
light of all the facts known to Officer Beesley, he was also 
justified in performing a pat-down of defendant for weapons, 
Trullo, 809 F.2d at 113. This knowledge was reinforced by 
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defendant's attempt to avoid the pat-down by pulling his hands 
from the car and reaching for his coat (R. 115). The intrusion 
was limited in scope to a pat-down outside of defendant's 
clothing until the officer felt a bulge that defendant identified 
to him as a knife (R. 41)• Terry, 392 U.S. at 25, approved this 
type of pat-down based upon a reasonable suspicion that the 
individual was armed. It is not necessary that the officer 
actually have experienced fear, only that a reasonable person 
under the circumstances would have believed himself or others to 
be in danger. See also Rovbal, 716 P.2d at 293. 
The appearance of these three men at 3:30 a.m. in a 
high crime area gave the officer not only the right but the duty 
to question them. Belanger, 677 P.2d at 783; State v. 
Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103, 105 (Utah 1980). While location alone 
is insufficient to justify a Terry stop, "Itlhe reputation of an 
area for criminal activity is an articulable fact upon which a 
police officer may legitimately rely." United States v. Gomez, 
633 F.2d 999, 1005 (2d Cir. 1980); see also Trullo, 809 F.2d at 
111, and cases cited therein. Their apparent evasiveness and 
nervousness, coupled with their inadequate responses to the 
request for identification and purpose for being there, and with 
defendant's attempts to conceal the bag he carried and to "ditch" 
it were sufficient grounds for the officer to graduate from mere 
conversation to a frisk for weapons. Because these factors, 
taken together, justify the officer's actions, there was no 
fourth amendment violation and the trial court properly refused 
to suppress the evidence. Although the behavior of defendant and 
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his companions might also be tortured into innocent interpreta-
tions, as defendant attempts to do, it is rare that an officer 
would observe behavior consistent only with guilt. Trullo, 809 
P.2d at 112. For this reason, the Terry standard is whether the 
conduct gives "risk to an articulable, reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity and not whether [it] can be construed as 
innocent through speculation." Trullo, 809 F.2d at 112. 
CONCLUSION 
The State requests this Court to affirm the trial 
court's refusal to suppress the evidence and deny defendant's 
requests for dismissal or a new trial. 
DATED this /6/A day of March, 1987. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
^/'SANDRA L. gjtfGI^ EN^  
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of 
the foregoing Brief of Respondent were mailed, postage prepaid, 
to Kendall S. Peterson, Attorney for Appellant, 333 South Second 
East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 this //>$ dav of March, 1987. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
